May 8, 2011

What I Have Learned

What I Have Learned: "

An investment program or a trading system must be specifically tailored to each and every individual. Risk tolerances, return targets and cash flow needs are critical in structuring a program of capital allocation for investors. All programs and systems are unique based upon our own biases and requirements.


I do believe, however, that there are broad-based investing maxims that can assist individuals in navigating the financial markets. These are the investment maxims I follow.


Human nature never changes.


My favourite investment quote is from Jesse Livermore who said


Wall Street never changes. The pockets change, the suckers change, the stocks change but Wall Street never changes because human nature never changes.


Knowing human behavior is a critical to successful investing. It does not matter if one is trading short-term or investing long-term, any trade or investment is an explicit or implicit bet on human behavior.


Understand history.


History is a guide. It is a road-map to the future. It does not predict what is going to happen exactly because structural shifts occur, but the forces of economic history shift slowly over time. I first read Reminiscences of a Stock Operator in 1998, and I was amazed at how accurately Livermore (through Edwin Lefevre) was describing our time. In the same way that officers are taught military history to understand the mistakes of past battles and the evolution of strategy, investors should understand financial history to understand the mistakes and context of financial markets. Mark Twain said history doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes. Karl Marx said history repeats itself, first as tragedy than as farce. Twain and Marx could have been talking about financial markets.


Hubris kills.


The words I cringe the most upon hearing are "can't" and "won't." When people say something "can't" or "won't" happen as it pertains to investments, I become very wary. In investing, anything can happen. Do not think in certainties. Think in probabilities. Banish the words "can't" and "won't happen" from your investing vocabulary. People with a high degree of certainty about the future are the ones most likely to get wiped out. Confidence is good. Hubris is not.


Most people cannot invest successfully. You are probably one of them.


You are hardwired to fail at investing. Literally. Your brain and neurological system are wired in such a way to separate you from your money. It is why your feel euphoric when your stocks are rising and why you feel revulsion when your stocks are falling. It is why you feel you have to buy something when it appears to be running away from you, and why you feel fearful when stocks are falling. Learning to deal with your natural instincts may be the single most important aspect to investing success. Fortunately, there have been significant advances in understanding behavioral finance and neuroeconomics over the past decade. I have listed books on the subject in my book log. Read those books ASAP.


This is not a part-time job.


It is difficult to do well investing and trading over the long-run without being dedicated to it. It is difficult to invest profitably by dedicating a half hour of study in the evening. Investing and trading is not a hobby. Investing is a profession, a craft, a systematic pursuit. If you are not willing to put the time and resources needed to be successful, you should not do this yourself. Pay someone else who does this for a living to invest for you. Or give the professional most of your money and invest in small amount yourself.


Protect your capital.


You cannot play the game if you have nothing to play with. For an investor, that means buying a stock with a significant margin of safety. For a trader, that means cutting your losses quickly. An investor can average down if they have purchased a stock with a significant margin of safety, a trader cannot. A trader must cut his losses. An investor must be certain there is a margin of safety in his investment. Otherwise, capital could become permanently impaired.


Be patient. You do not always have to be involved.


I am an impatient person. I do not like waiting for a minute. I get bored easily and want to do something. Plus, I am greedy and feel that if I am not doing something, I am not accomplishing anything. But this works against me. Patience is a virtue when investing. I have found that I have done really well being patient, and I do much less well being impatient. You do not always have to be involved. Sometimes it is best to just step aside and not buy or sell anything.


Do not invest or trade something you do not understand.


Is this not obvious? You do not need to know Microsoft’s code to invest in Microsoft, but you should know what Microsoft does. If you are trading symbols, know your process cold.


Have a process and keep an open mind.


All great investors and traders have a process. Some great investors are great visionaries with nerves of steel. Some great traders flit in and out of markets successfully. However, all have a process. Different processes are often a function of differing emotional temperament and intellectual curiosity. Everyone is different and different processes will appeal to different people. But the important thing is to have a process. Your process will evolve over time. You will not do things perfectly. Thus, keep an open mind on what works for you and what does not. If there is a weakness in your process, be willing to change it.


Process and strategy are a function of time.


Whether a trade or investment is right or wrong is often a function of time. I both trade and invest. When I trade, I look out a few months. When I invest, I look out a few years. How each strategy plays out is dependent upon time. In the short-term, what matters most is momentum. In the long-term, what matters most is economics. In the short-term, news flow, sentiment and emotion are all the matters. In the long-term, what you pay for a stock relative to the long-term prospects for a stock is all that matters. If you are an investor, the crowd is usually wrong in the long-run. If you are a trader, the crowd is usually right in the short-run.


Time frames matter.


Wall Street tells its retail clientele that stocks are for the long-run. This is true, over generations. If you start methodically and systemically investing in stocks when you are 20 or 25 years of age, you can weather the volatility of the market and buy at almost any valuation and end up with a nice nest egg when you retire. But this is not necessarily true for most people. Most people do not start saving significantly until their mid-40s or later. If someone starts a saving plan at 45 with the goal of retiring at 65, plowing money into the stock market expecting to earn the historical return to equities of 10%, the results can be devastating if stocks bought at the wrong valuation. A 10% annual return over 10 years equates to a 159% gain compounded. But the US stock market has declined since the beginning of 2000. For the 55 year-old who started investing in stocks a decade ago, this is a huge hole in his retirement account compared to what he expected.


Do not base your actions on the opinions of others.


There are a lot of smart people doing stupid things in the world. Simply because someone sounds smart does not mean they are necessarily correct. I can remember just starting out as a portfolio manager, reading an extensive industry analysis by a well-respected Wall Street analyst, thinking “That doesn’t make sense.” I liked the thesis but could not get around this aspect regarding inventory that kept nagging me which the analyst had brushed off. I thought “Well, he knows more than I do,” and invested despite my reservation because everything else sounded good. Turns out, I was dead right, and I lost money because I trusted someone else's argument rather than my own instincts.


Take more risk when you are younger. Take less risk as you get older.


When you are younger, you rely primarily on income from your job. When you are older, you rely primarily on income from savings. Thus, you can take more risk with your savings when you are younger and less risk when you are older. When you are older, a sustained dip in the value of your savings can significantly alter your lifestyle. Thus, your primary goal should be to avoid losses. Conversely, a mistake many young people make is not taking enough risk. The corollary in investing is that, over time, higher risk means higher returns. Since younger people have more time before needing to draw on retirement savings, they should take more risk, and vice-versa.


Risk is however you define it.


Risk is usually defined in two ways – volatility and loss of capital. Academics, quantitative investors and consultants tend to define risk solely as volatility. Investors, usually value investors, tend to define risk solely as the loss of capital, particularly the permanent loss of capital. In truth, the answer depends upon your own circumstances. Some people do not want to see their capital fall, ever. To them, they do not care if an investment they purchased is worth 60 cents on the dollar that falls to 30 cents on the dollar. They care that it fell, period. To someone living off savings, volatility can be devastating, given that a fall in savings means relatively more capital is drawn down when savings are being tapped. This same affect occurs with an endowment or a pension fund that is required to disburse funds at periodic intervals, whereby volatility in itself can result in the permanent loss of capital to the fund. However, if one does not need to draw on capital for an extended period of time, and one has the fortitude to withstand the ups and downs in the market, volatility is irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is the permanent loss of capital.


The only thing that matters is how much money you make. Or, the only thing that matters is how much risk you take.


We do not trade nor invest to test dogmatic philosophies. We trade and invest to make money. In the end, what matters is the size of your account. Having the most logical or most elegant system means nothing if you cannot make money from it. Making money, however, is a matter of taking risk. Over time, the more risk you take, the more money you will make. At times, you want to take lots of risk, at other times, you want to take no risk at all. Understanding your risk profile and managing risk is perhaps the most important aspect of all in money management.


The only (other) thing that matters is price.


You invest and trade to make money. You should not invest or trade for any other reason. For example, you do not invest or trade a stock because it is a great company. I do not know how many times I have heard an investor say that they were investing in a stock because it was a great company. Cisco was a great company in 2000 when it was trading at 118x earnings. It was a great company when it was trading at 7x earnings. Investors who bought at 118x earnings lost 90% of their money top to bottom. A great company can make you great losses if you buy at the wrong price. For traders, if the price is working against you, get out! Get out now! If the price action is poor, the market is telling you are wrong. In the short-term, arguing against the market is a losing proposition. Do not do it.


Focus on what is going to happen, not what has happened.


This may sound trite but investors are often focused on what has already happened, not what is going to happen. People want to focus on what has made them money in the past. Nobody cared about homebuilders before the housing bubble, but you still see a disproportionate amount of commentary on homebuilders today, even though they have been crushed. After the tech bubble collapsed, investors focused on tech stocks for years and ignored, at least initially, basic materials and industrial stocks. And when the bull market inevitably ends in commodities, investors will focus on commodities for years afterwards.


Do not ignore the macro environment.


One does not have to be a macro trader to understand that the macro environment matters. Self-avowed stock pickers often brush aside macro issues, stating that no one can forecast the economy so you should not pay attention to the macro economy but instead focus on valuation and quality of the company. However, if one looked at the banks in 2006, one would have seen many great companies with stocks that appeared reasonably valued. But the edifice upon which the banks had built their businesses was dependent upon housing prices. Having a view on the banks meant having a view on housing prices. If one was bearish on the banks, one was bearish on housing prices and the concurrent collapse of the financial system, which was a macro call. The KBW Bank Index (the BKX) fell 86% peak to trough, which was greater than the Nasdaq’s decline of 78% after the collapse of the Tech Bubble. High quality banks like Wells Fargo and US Bancorp fell 75% or more. Yes, they have recovered, due in large part to government largesse - a political call even more disconnected from individual company fundamentals - but the volatility has been enormous, and most bank stocks have returned nothing over the past seven years.


It is much easier to make money in a bull market than a bear market.


It should be obvious that it is much easier to make money in a market that goes up 200% over a decade than one that is flat during that same time. For example, you would have been much better investing in commodities over the past decade than stocks, just like you would have been much better investing in stocks rather than almost everything else over the prior two decades.


Things can go on for longer than seems reasonable.


I remember thinking that technology was getting nutty in 1996. I thought housing was getting stupid in 2003. Boy, was I wrong. Both were just beginning. Trends tend to last a long time. Do not underestimate the strength of a trend.


Eventually, all bull markets and all bear markets end.


It is difficult to know exactly when bull and bear markets begin and end. However, they eventually do. You might be late in making that determination but understand that the end is an eventual certainty. Structural bull markets tend to last 10 to 20 years, so you have time in determining whether or not a bull market has begun or ended.

"

May 5, 2011

on Portugal and Spain

Earlier this week, we learnt about the Portugal bailout and the Finnish giving sufficient leeway.
I think that most of the people / parties with a good understanding of the issue argued that Portugal needed a hawkish IMF bailout, not a dovish EU bailout.

By proceeding with the latter, Portugal and the EU decision-makers are buying time and procrastinating on must-to-do measures that would be a win-win for the Portuguese and for all its euro-partners. Some of these measures would include the privatization of stated-owned companies, economic liberalization (winding down subsidies, cutting red tape), deregulation of the labour market, and many more measures aimed to improve Portugal's competitiveness under a no-depreciation monetary system like the euro.

Elsewhere, Spain gave a pretty bad piece of news regarding the employment / unemployment measures. Surprisingly, the former were worse than the latter. Let me explain myself: 7110 people were added to the unemployment list in April (cyclically adjusted) adding up to 4,746,552 unemployed people in Spain ... which is 'rumbo a los cinco millones'.
But to make things worse, the number of employed people by the public administration rose significantly.

Take a look at these figures:
+ Pasive population: 23,5m
- Under 16: 7,900,000
- Above 64: 7,800,000
- in between, not listed / not searching: 7,700,000

+ Active population: 23m
- Civil servants / funcionarios: 3,185,900 (12 months before they were 3,088,000)
- Unemployed: 4,746,552
- Self-employed: 2,830,000
- Employed by private corporations: 11,935,000 (12 months before: 12,165,000)

It is quite clear that the Spanish workered is being cornered, suffering the heavy toll of the worse-ever political class seen in this country. This load, and the anticipation of heavier future loads as the deficit is reduced draws a rather ugly painting both for employers and especially for employees.

In the meantime ... the EUR is soaring and Spain, despite its dozens/hundreds of international pro-trade offices around the world (ICEX for Spain, IVEX for Valencia ...), is still unable to export anything but sun.


How is this translated to the stock markets?
... keep shorting Spanish-based assets like real estate.

JPM gave a call earlier this week about some peripheral-countries companies.
The buy list included these companies:
Spanish: abengoa, bbva, campofrio, inditex, tecnicas reunidas, telefonica,
Portuguese: cementos de portugal, semapa
Elsewhere: BIOX GA, DCC ID, GLB ID, ICON ID.

The sell list included:
Spanish: ACCIONA, ALMIRALL, SABADELL, B. VALENCIA, B. POPULAR, BANKINTER, BME, Corp Fin Alba, FCC, Gas Natural, Prisa. Sol Melia.
Portuguese: BCP PL, GALP PL
Elsewhere: TPEIR GA, EUROB GA,
OPAP GA, TT GA, GCC ID,

My favorite 'buys' are
1) Santander (san.mc) at around 8+eur/share. It has a very diversified business portfolio; a stable Tier 1 capital (9+%), and very attractive dividend yield (7 / 8%)
2) Grupo SOS (sos.mc). Now suffering selling pressure from the 'cajas', which became shareholders at 50cent/share in the last debt restructuring deal and seem to be selling their stakes. I want to believe (and have some info to back it up) that the price is depressed below its fair value, reflecting that supply/demand imbalance.
3) Telefonica, good dividend yield, international exposure (including LatAm, WE, ...

On the sell side, during the last year I was a keen short-seller of ...
1) Popular (pop.mc) based on the previous arguments regarding the spanish labour market, and its consequences over the purchase power of society overall, and of the real estate prices in particular. Now that euribor is higher I would keep short-selling at around 4.5eur/share; and the same for the rest of national banks (not international).
2) BME seems cornered: the electronic venues will probably prove to be quite harmful in the long run; no international or diversification opportunities ... so keep collecting dividends but I also see a sell when it's lurking / hovering around its previous peaks.
3)Prisa is in this list for 'meritos propios'. Imo, a firm candidate for the worse company in the spanish investment market.

May 4, 2011

Arbitrage M&A: Talecris & Grifols

The M&A arbitrage arises as an opportunity to benefit from the spread between the bidding price, and the market price. The biggest risk associated with this strategy is that the bidding firm would withdraw its offer (which is not in the interest of the investment bank); and the biggest opportunity would be associated with a bidding war, in which third companies bid above the previous offer.

Research has shown higher stakes in the target firms on behalf of the investment banks advising both the bidder and the target firm (especially the former); but I do not remember how developed is the research about the profitability of the arbitrage opportunities.

One book covering the issue is Warren Buffett and the Art of Stock Arbitrage, from which this is an excerpt:
In professors Gerald Martin and John Puthenpurackal's study of Berkshire Hathaway's stock portfolio's performance from 1980 to 2003, they discovered that the portfolio's 261 individual investments had an average annualized rate of return of 39.3%. Even more amazing was that out of those 261 investments, 59 of them were identified as arbitrage deals. And those 59 arbitrage deals produced an average annualized rate of return of 81.28%! Warren's arbitrage performance not only beat his regular portfolio's performance, it also stomped the average annualized performance of every other investment option in America by a mile. No one - be it individual or firm - even came close...

... good to know.

Elsewhere, the M&A deals covering companies listed in different currencies will have attached a 'currency risk', for which investors should ask a compensation.

For all these reasons, I have become interested in the Grifols bid for Talecris.
Grifols is bidding $19/share and 0,6485 own shares/talecris share.
With the former trading at around 14 eur/share, the latter could be priced at around 32,5 usd/share (assuming the bid would be successful).

I think it is a good risk/return opportunity and I have bought today some shares,
TLCR (nasdaq) @ 27,5usd/share.
More info about this deal can be found in the web, e.g.: bloomberg.
... will see how it ends.


Here there are some raw-sources for arbitrage-driven trades: sinletter, mergerinvesting, theonlineinvestor and here the required due-diligence and storytelling: dealbook, reuters.

Apr 30, 2011

Two deficits, two austerities, and quantities matter

Two deficits, two austerities, and quantities matter: "

The excellent Kindred Winecoff considers the troubled periphery of the Eurozone:




[A]usterity must occur. It’s only a matter of how it occurs. The alternative to an internal devaluation through wage cuts, tax increases, and reduction of social services is external devaluation (exit from euro) and default. Call it the Iceland Alternative (Iceland was never in the euro, but it did devalue/default, which is what we’re talking about). In that scenario, the new drachma and Irish pound will collapse in value and the government will be unable to borrow from international capital markets. This is austerity too. The government budget will have to be balanced almost immediately, and unless there’s a full default will likely need to run a primary surplus for many years.



Moreover, small open economies like Greece and Ireland are heavily reliant on imports to maintain standards of living. Ireland imported about 40% of its GDP in 2009; Greece about 1/3. For comparison, the U.S. imported about 14% of its GDP. If the post-euro currencies drop 50% in those countries (as Iceland’s did, and it was never attached to the euro), then those imports become 100% more expensive. That’s a big price increase. True, there will be some substitution into domestically-produced goods, but such a large adjustment will take time and cause pain. These are not large, diversified economies and there’s a reason domestic production wasn’t being consumed before; overall standards of living will have to drop if there’s a currency devaluation. And while exporting industries may benefit from a cheaper currency, boosting employment in those sectors, the importing industries will suffer, contracting employment in those sectors. Even if overall employment goes up, it will be at much lower relative wages. This is why Iceland is applying for EU membership, including adoption of the currency, despite the sacrifice of policymaking autonomy that entails.



In other words, there will be austerity. The only question is how it’s distributed.




Winecoff makes an important point, but I think he needs to cut his analysis a bit more finely. Economies run two very different kinds of deficits, a government fiscal deficit and an international current account deficit. Although the two deficits are related, there is no mechanical connection between the two. They do not reliably move together.



A country that defaults on its international debt will find its paper shunned international capital markets for a while. In countries that have grown accustomed to running current account deficits — that is, countries whose citizens have grown used to consuming more imports than they pay for with exports — a forced return to international balance will undoubtedly be perceived as a form of austerity.



But Winecoff is wrong to claim that “[t]he government budget will have to be balanced almost immediately, and unless there’s a full default will likely need to run a primary surplus for many years”. As long as the country, post-default, issues its own currency, and as long as the country’s citizenry is interested in accumulating domestic currency and debt, the government can run a budget deficit after the restructuring. The capacity of a country to run budget deficits post-crisis will depend largely on the citizenry’s confidence in domestic institutions after the fall. (Countries can also employ controls to prevent capital flight and support domestic currency. But in cosmopolitan, habitually integrated Europe, I suspect that won’t work unless people have some measure of confidence in the project. Wise governments would implement technocratically credible monetary institutions and simultaneously encourage patriotic enthusiasm for the country’s newly independent scrip.)



Winecoff’s example of Iceland is a great case in point. Following its collapse and quasi-default in 2008, the Iceland ran a budget deficit of 9.3% of GDP in 2009 (a primary deficit of 6.6%), and has continued to run deficits since, gently drifting towards balance. Iceland has also been able to sustain large current account deficits as well for a while after the crisis, which helps to cushion the adjustment. Iceland received loans from the IMF and several European countries, which partially financed its continuing international deficit. Also, private citizens of Iceland may have had foreign asset holdings which they could pledge or sell to finance imports while the economy shifted towards international balance.



Iceland’s circumstances were, perhaps, unusually benign. Other crises (Argentina in 2002, Russia in 1998) proceeded much as Winecoff describes, with sharp, simultaneous moves towards fiscal balance and current account surplus. But would crises in the Eurozone look more Argentina or like Iceland? I don’t know, but I can make a strong case for Iceland. Savers in the Eurozone periphery inhabit a world of open financial borders, and have already been diversifying out of home-country bank deposits. (Importantly, this forces governments and the ECB to cover financing gaps left by fleeing depositors.) Argentine savers perceived dedollarization as expropriation, which was corrosive to the legitimacy of domestic institutions. Citizens of the Eurozone periphery, on the other hand, might support their governments’ bid to escape impossible foreign debt. The drawn out, slow motion nature of the Euro crisis has made it easy for private citizens to prepare for Euro exit by sending funds abroad. This practice shifts the costs of default to governments, who in turn can shift costs to external creditors. If domestic publics support the move and believe Euro exit to be a one-off event rather than the start of recurrent devaluation cycles, governments may well be able to run deficits and use Keynesian fiscal policy to smooth the aftershocks of Euro exit.



There may be important differences of institutional credibility between Greece and, say, Ireland or Spain. An Irish exit might be more Icelandic, while a Greek exit might be more Argentine. (It’s worth pointing out that, a decade later, Argentina’s default seems to have worked out very well.) As in Iceland, the (growing) foreign savings of private citizens might cushion the shift from international deficit. (Euro drop-outs could not expect the post-crisis IMF support that Iceland enjoyed, though.) There is a hazard that the furious Eurozone core would try to hold the private wealth of citizens of the periphery as security against the defaulted debt of sovereigns. But that would be a stronger violation of current norms than sovereign default.



Suppose that it will be possible for a drop-out to run a fiscal deficit, but as Winecoff predicts, a sharp shift to international balance proves inescapable. Winecoff is absolutely right to point out that



small open economies… are heavily reliant on imports to maintain standards of living… If the post-euro currencies drop 50% in those countries (as Iceland’s did…), then those imports become 100% more expensive. That’s a big price increase… [S]uch a large adjustment will take time and cause pain. These are not large, diversified economies


Undoubtedly, ending an era of persistent current account deficits will prove painful to consumers accustomed to cheap imports. However, that is not ultimately an incremental cost of leaving the Euro. After all, the purpose of staying and suffering austerity would be to pay down indebtedness, which is more costly than a shift to balance. Contrite borrowers have to pay interest on past debt and run (primary) surpluses. Deadbeats just need to pay for what they buy now. Quantities matter. Staying within the Eurozone offers the palliative of stretching the pain out over time, but increases the ultimate burden of the adjustment. Exiting front-loads costs, but reduces their size, as much of the work is done by the act of default. Undoubtedly, jilted creditors would punish “Euro deadbeats”, and exact non-financial costs, so the benefits of debt write-offs would be counterbalanced, at least in part, by new costs. There’d have to be some cost-benefit analysis. But the options are not, as Winecoff suggests, a zero-sum shift in how countries take their lumps. Countries may find they have a lot fewer lumps to take if they repudiate their debt than if they don’t.



Losing the capacity to run a current account deficit and losing the capacity to run a fiscal deficit have very different implications. Shifting international accounts from deficit to balance harms citizens in their role of consumers, but serves them in their roles as workers and savers. If you view the current crisis as driven by the challenge of maintaining consumers’ standard of living measured in tradable goods, then losing the ability to run current account deficits seems harsh. But if you view the crisis as driven by frustration within countries over insufficient opportunity and employment, then shifting to international balance or even to surplus helps. Losing the capacity to run a fiscal deficit has the opposite effect. Where current account austerity increases labor demand, fiscal austerity reduces it. So if you think that underemployment is the pressing problem in the Europeriphery, current account austerity plus continued fiscal deficit is a golden combination.



Lots of countries, obviously emerging Asia but also Germany, seem to prefer the social goods that come with full employment and financial security to the consumer purchasing power gains that accompany current account deficits. The countries of the Eurozone periphery have so far “chosen” the path of excess consumption, but it’s not clear whether that represents a genuine preference or a historical accident. This isn’t to minimize the pain and disruption that would undoubtedly attend import scarcity. Changing human habits hurts. But, as Joni Mitchell might say, something’s lost but something’s gained. This would not be a novel sort of transition. It would be a reprise of the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.



Leaving the Euro would not be all bows and flows of angel’s hair. But it would not necessarily be catastrophe, and there is no fixed quantity of austerity that Europeriphery countries have to face one way or some other. These countries have difficult choices before them, and should think carefully about the tradeoffs and just what sort of outcomes they hope to engineer.






Note: I have very mixed feelings about any break-up of the Eurozone. This piece was not intended as advocacy of that. I do think the European core is being foolish and shortsighted in its dealings with the periphery. In a better world, the core countries would equitize their claims against the periphery by, for example, adopting some variation of Warren Mosler’s frequent suggestion that the ECB issue per capita grants to all member states, that surplus nations would use as they see fit but debtor states would use to reduce indebtedness.

"

Apr 22, 2011

on Greece

Interesting comments from Alphaville (from Citi’s Greek banking team).


The decision of whether to haircut or not is a cost-benefit analysis. For Greece, we believe, the pros include: immediately lower interest payments; faster progression to positive fiscal balance; and less pressure on the government to press on with austerity measures. The cons for Greece could include: denied access to the capital markets; deterioration in relations with Euro Area and EU members (if the haircut is done “prematurely”); and a round of recapitalisation for the domestic Greek banking sector and some Government entities (such as the social security fund). In order to minimise the cons of haircutting, Greece will likely await a macro inflection point — where real GDP growth starts turning positive and the primary balance enters positive territory. This is important as it could potentially allow Greece easier re-entry into the capital markets. Such an inflection point, according to our and other market participants’ estimates, could be the year 2013.

on Bernanke and the US

I think that Mr. Bernanke deserves a lot of credit for what he has accomplished:
The US is semi defaulting by dollar depreciation, which will indeed help the US to grow its way out of debt.

Elsewhere, the dollar depreciation will boost 'Corporate America' results, which in turn, will spur Americans to spend more, as they feel richer due to the 'wealth effect'. Needless to say, to avoid losing purchase power they have to put their dollars to work (which was an intended consequence from Ben as well), either in real assets / invested in equity, or convert them to other currencies (increases the supply of usd, the demand of the target currency, and therefore pushes the usd lower).

Given that the usd is already quite cheap by PPP and other more sophisticated valuation metrics, the first option is the most sensible: buy shares. They are still fairly priced.
It seems that the market has risen (from the lows) by more or less the same proportion as earnings have done; therefore the valuation multiples are still at around the market bottoms.
E.g.: (implied) ERP on April 1 =5.31%. Source: Prof. Damodaran

The dark side of this policy of boosting the economy by dollar depreciation is that social imbalances are growing at a faster peace than expected/desirable. The skilled professionals enjoy a labor market with little unemployment and high salaries. Especially bankers, who have received subsidies (from the taxpayer) to make their annual bonus. While the mid class is being skewed, and the low class is probably still suffering at levels that remind them of the crisis.

--
Ben S. Bernanke
Was the Howard Harrison and Gabrielle Snyder Beck Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, Ben Bernanke received his B.A. in economics from Harvard University -suma cum laude-capturing both the Allyn Young Prize for best Harvard undergraduate economics thesis and the John H. Williams prize for outstanding senior in the economics department. He holds a PhD. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.